The Distinction Between the Moral and the Societal: From Piaget and Kohlberg to Social Domain Theory

Abstract

This article aims to clarify the distinction among the moral, social-conventional, and personalpsychological
domains through epistemic criteria (Turiel, 1983; 2002). It has been consistently
demonstrated empirically that the moral domain rests on generalizable, authority-independent
principles such as harm, rights, and justice; the social-conventional domain on authority, rules,
and consensus; and the personal domain on autonomous choice. First, Piaget’s and Kohlberg’s
structural-developmental, stage-based approaches are properly situated, and common
misreadings in the Turkish literature, such as rigid linear stage assumptions, equating “genetic
epistemology” with biological reductionism, and sidelining content and context, are briefly
corrected. Next, the criteria underlying domain-specific distinctions—dependence on authority
and rules, generalizability, and personal autonomy—are systematically defined. The rendering
of the theory as “Toplumsal Alan Kuramı” in Turkish, along with the interchangeable use of
social/societal/toplumsal, is discussed as a terminological issue that undermines theoretical
coherence. Finally, against the trend toward “scale-ification,” the methodological fit of
justification analysis, as informed by semi-structured interviews, with the theory is argued. In the
second section, work from 1975 to 2025 is briefly synthesized along three lines: (1) coordination
across domains; (2) differentiation of judgments in the context of group processes, peer exclusion,
and inequality; and (3) implications for educational practice (inclusive education, strengthening
a rights/justice discourse). The article aims to provide conceptual clarity for the accurate
application of the framework and to resolve terminological ambiguities, ensuring that domain
distinctions inform research design and data interpretation directly.